States, Markets, and Foreign Aid

Why do some donor governments pursue international development through recipient governments, while others bypass such local authorities? Weaving together scholarship in political economy, public administration, and historical institutionalism, Simone Dietrich will argue in her talk that the bureaucratic institutions of donor countries shape donor–recipient interactions differently despite similar international and recipient country conditions. Donor nations employ institutional constraints that authorize, enable, and justify particular aid delivery tactics while precluding others. Offering quantitative and qualitative analyses of donor decision-making, her talk will illuminate how donors with neoliberally organized public sectors bypass recipient governments, while donors with more traditional public sector-oriented institutions cooperate and engage recipient authorities on aid delivery. She will demonstrate how internal beliefs and practices surrounding states and markets inform how donors see and set their objectives for foreign aid and international development itself. Her findings contribute to the debates on aid effectiveness and donor coordination and have implications for the study of foreign policy more broadly.

Simone Dietrich is Associate Professor in Political Science and International Relations at the University of Geneva, Switzerland. She is the author of States, Markets, and Foreign Aid (Cambridge University Press, 2021). Her articles have appeared in leading political science and international relations journals. Her research explores how donor governments make decisions about foreign aid, how aid promotes development and democratic change in recipient countries, and how international organizations shape the creation and development of international development practices.