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Isabela Mares | Economic Statecraft and Negotiated Justice in Global Markets

So thank you to Leon and to Lucio and to Jens for the invitation. It is so great to be here to see the great things that are happening at the Max Planck Institute. You know, the sort of the traditional political economy that is being done here. Uh, so, as you know, this is a new project for me. Um, I'm, um, sort of have not worked on, on this issue of, uh, of demarcation, but maybe kind of a new look in things that look familiar may help actually kind of, you know, sort of identify, uh, you know, where where the blind spots in our literature are. I, um, I'm teaching courses on party politics and, um, you know, and I noticed that, uh, that this, this issue on even sort of right understanding when and why, uh, parties demarcate by which I mean sort of right, setting up a decision not to cooperate, either in Parliament or in the government with an extremist party is not well integrated in electron models of of politics, right. Where? Right where the party is naturally kind of, you know, choose the sort of at a more proximate party. So I thought that is a sort of a nice area to to investigate both theoretically and empirically. And as you will see, I will draw on a large number of cases, like twenty four cases, sort of over one hundred years, and in France and Germany, to sort of to understand these, these choices. So just to motivate the talk, I mean, I'm going to start with some examples. And just these are important because they illustrate what this project does empirically before I delve into the theory. So at the Congress of nineteen twenty, Congress of the Socialist Party, okay, which was held in nineteen twenty. Two thirds of the members left the party, you know, disillusioned with the party. And they formed, you know, what was later, one year later, was called the French Communist Party. So, uh, the the party, you know, was immediately kind of, you know, controlled by Moscow. Okay. Who sort of decided over kind of its membership selection and its strategy, and it became kind of a joint the second Communist International in twenty one. So at the time, the Socialist Party and here's Léon Blum took up a very, very hard, firm reaction against the communists. Okay. So Blum maintained that Russia's interference in the affairs of the French labor movement was fundamentally undemocratic, that the decisions were no longer being made by party members, but by a foreign kind of revolutionary movement. Okay. And such subordination to Moscow violated the principles of national sovereignty, and on this occasion, French Soviet socialists, who are still a hero in my study, displayed a remarkable kind of coalitional flexibility when seeing a sort of like front experiencing kind of threat and the rise of a sort of a competitor of a non-democratic competitor. On the left, the French socialists, okay, abandoned their long held position in favor of proportional representation and moved towards a reform that sort of reintroduced the two round majoritarian system that had been the electoral system of the Republic. And this kind of electoral change, by which they really abandoned something that was had been kind of central for their electoral strategy, was really a, you know, successful in blocking kind of, you know, sort of right for, for the few next elections. I mean, kind of, you know, things will change the kind of the Communist Party strategy will change in the thirties, but in blocking kind of, you know, the communist, uh, rise. And this is an example, right, of a kind of a strategy that we don't consider at the moment on sort of radical electoral reform. When and under what conditions is this possible? This is not just an isolated story of the Third Republic. Okay. In the Fourth Republic, again, we see the

same kind of development. Okay. Initially a coalition between kind of socialists and and communists kind of, you know, and, and the right are putting together the kind of the constitution of the Fourth Republic and then again, kind of, you know, the Communist Party being hijacked by Moscow. Being kind of right. Changing its kind of strategy. Attacking kind of, you know, the Republic. Attacking the Marshall Plan, attacking under the policies of the government. And again, kind of Léon Blum again, the kind of the socialist rise on this occasion and this sort of very, you know, powerful statement in the Parliament, you know, saying that there is a threat to the Republic. I'm here to sound the appeal. I'm here to rally all the Republicans, all those who refuse to submit themselves to their personal dictatorship of the proletariat, of a political party. And what do they do again? They dedicate. This is what I mean. Demarcation. Right. You call the other parties, right? Extremist kind of, you know, you refuse to right cooperation with them even though you were in government with them. And what do they do next? They again change the electoral system. Right? They again reintroduce majoritarian elections. Okay. With the goal to block the communist threat. Now kind of coming in this order. So again, just to contrast this and I'm gonna be using this contrast for a part of my talk. A different response in Germany following the assassination of Gustav Rathenau in twenty two. We had at that time, in a way, one of the most left leaning kind of governments of the Weimar period, the coalition of led by, but which had significant kind of number of social Democrats together with a kind of in in government against all parties kind of distancing themselves from their far right threat. The socialists on that occasion even distancing themselves from the kind of Communist Party or sort of the communist. And I've been going to a record recently, and I know that the communists actually wrote to them trying to sort of to form an alliance. And the socialists refused. So both centrist parties democratic. But what is the response here? The response is a sort of association band. So we see different responses. Right, okay. And so right. And what I so this is sort of a question that motivates the study is how can we I explain politically? You know, when survived, when countries choose different strategies of democratic defense. And this is a two stage process, as this example has illustrated. You first have to decide whether to demarcate. I'm going to give you a more formal definition of demarcation. But it is a decision not to form a coalition, a governmental or a parliamentary coalition with the extremist party. So when do the market, when the market may seem like a simple question, but it's actually we don't know much about this. And then how do you choose different policies. Okay. And again I gave you here an example electoral reform versus party. But I'm going to increase the menu of policies more. If we look at this literature, there's a large literature in constitutional law in all of the political theory and liberal democracy. Yet there is no political science kind of explanation. Um, I will come back. I mean, there is this this old, uh, book by Giovanni Capoccia. Okay. So it is just very, you know, kind of, in a way, country level, right? I mean, kind of if you adopt militant democracy. If you adopt a party ban so that you remain democratic, if you don't kind of, you know, you become authoritarian. That's basically the thesis, but it's not fully worked out until the right which party chooses these strategies and why, and what are the costs of enforcing them? So what I'm trying to think in this book is think through this issue from the right, from the traditional spatial models of competition, but bringing new ideas about voters. And think about how voters examine that and how voters trade off Democratic quality against votes. Okay. And this kind of trade offs then allows me to understand sort of by party, party strategists over this kind of these issues. So again, sort of everything is under the shadow of, you know, how this literature. Okay. So the kind of, you know, the term democracy, the landscape kind of, you know, sort of much of the debate, uh, in post-war Germany with huge political and legal influence. But if we kind of step back and examine kind of this critically. Himself only thinks about the very narrow set of strategies. He only thinks about the party bad. But there's many other things that that parties can do. Okay, we have this work in political science. Nancy Barnett, to some extent, and ordinary people in extraordinary times are thinking about this. But I'm I'm sort of like trying to connect to this. So the menu okay. So we I'm sort of in in the study I make the distinction between three sets of strategies. It can be a systemic. What I mean by systemic is you you modify the rules for the entire political system. Right? You modify the rules not just for the extremist parties, but you modify the rules for everyone. Again, I'm not a theorist, but this seems to be normative, more desirable than kind of banning an extreme parties. And I give you like these two examples from Third Republic and Fourth Republic funds for sort of like

this was attempted and actually accomplish that. You can have some of that metal, this set of strategies that one calls kind of collective strategies. I mean, this is the typical Orenstein and Millet and democracy banning associations or party bans. Okay. They are they have their normative problems. They have them sometimes are not noticed. But how are they traded off against the more systemic strategies and then actually, like the one that really fascinated me and that motivated the study, the one that is least understood, which is the individuals. I mean, why don't you take away their immunity? You can just target individual politicians. You can just go to them. And if you think the party ban is normatively so problematic and so difficult to enter, why don't you just take away their immunity? That should be so simple to do. And yet, as I learned, and as I will show you, this is very, very hard to do also, and has always said, but this is an underutilized kind of tool of, you know, sort of of democratic defense. This is the menu. What I do in the in the studies, these are, in the end, the ones that are Most uh common is on individual or collective, and the systemic one revoking the immunity by modifying immunity rules to sanction extremist parties, banning parties or associations, or introducing electoral reform. And I do this sort of right now, I mean, studies following this work and other, you know, sort of these longitudinal studies are really the best ways to survive, keep a lot of things constant. But at the same time, kind of, you know, very kind of, you know, um, sort of electoral competition and other sort of factors, including over one hundred years of reforms in these two kind of countries. My example shows you there is a variation, and then at the end, I will sort of show you also some experiments that test the foundation of my theory that examines sort of like who wants demarcation. So in the kind of contemporary German colonies, I'm sure you all have ideas about this. We'd love to hear who wants the Panama and what are the costs of this strategy and sort of. Right. And then how voters think about the different choice. So some definitions an extremist party following Sartori is very conventional, is a party that rejects the legitimacy of a political system. And I'm going to sort of have it's not going to get very sophisticated, but just I will give you an idea in the picture. Okay. There will be two dimensions of your competition. So parties take positions on policies, but they also take position on this demarcation. So they decide whether or not they want to rule out a set of policies that may be ideologically proximate to them. Okay. By saying, no, this is not them. So how do they think about this? So pollsters and politicians have preferences on both dimensions. As I said, I was talking to one of the students. I mean, I always build my work from the microfoundations out. Okay, like theory of preferences kind of carries that, you know, you can solve the pocketbook, so don't know why. So this is sort of how I see demarcation and forget about the utility that goes into it. But assuming kind of, you know, sort of right, voters have an idea for it. So we take this from the spatial model, like voters have an idea for it, but that for particular values of this parameter d that I'm introducing in the kind of voters utility, there will be some areas on which the utility of voters will be zero, meaning the voter will not take any proposal that is, on the surface, the simplest intuitive way. So it makes an offer here to reject it, even though it is it is kind of very close. Okay. So right. So we all we need for this is to augment kind of, you know, sort of like the standard utility with just with this additional parameter d . And intuitively we can think of two types of voters democratic minimalists okay. They sort of like this is the standard voter that would take any kind of, you know, proposal, they would not reject offers that come from the extremist party. Okay. They all they care about this policy or there will be the maximalist would be very, very narrow here. Everything will be zero. They will not touch the proposal of the extremist party. So of course, then you can then think, all right. And voters have different ideal points. Voters have different values of this kind of legitimacy parameter. And we want to understand how parties make choices given the mix of voters they have. But that's sort of the intuition. And it's quite clear now the value of the democracy parameter is very hard to observe your legitimacy parameter. You know how much sort of like, I mean, whether or not you would support a politician that that makes kind of, you know, that takes that sort of signs a bill with, with the far right party. Okay. But but maybe parties don't know the distribution of the voters. Okay. So there is a heterogeneity of voters within the party between Democratic maximalists and minimalists. And so a party that enforces demarcation, if you have a lot of minimalists is a problem, right. Because you incur an electoral cost. I mean, you may do what you feel is normatively desirable, but there will be voters that would sanction you. So then we need to understand, sort of like how is it that voters are kind of, you know, sort of like make this choice. And so here is sort of like the

dilemma of a party. The the party has only two types of voter. Here's the one that is closer and one that is further away from the party. Now, if the party sets up a kind of, you know, sort of chooses this, sort of like this sort of, you know, utility function, and it's going to sort of stick to both groups and it's going to not enforce the partition versus here if the party enforces demarcation, okay. It's sort of like more, more closer to disorders. Better. But it's going to come at an electoral cost. It's going to lose the voters that that actually prefer in policy terms, the voters, um, of the extreme parties. So the occasion implies an electoral loss of voters. So how do parties choose now this is sort of right where I'm developing the theory. I will come with something you may think very simple to you, but even this sort of takes some time to test. I'm saying that basically whether or not the party chooses whether can force a mutation or not depends on the structure of electoral competition of the other parties, and on the coalitional opportunities that exist in the policy space. If the main party blocks are very closely aligned, so there's very low ideological polarization, then it may make sense to enforce demarcation because you have sort of a likely coalition partner, but there is not very far away from you, kind of, you know, ideologically distant, and you may sort of lose some of the voters on the fringes. Okay. And that's, that's you're going to incur this cost. But kind of you have a stable, you know, I call this the centrist coalition. And of course, you think of the German example today. That would be an example of a centrist coalition. However, if the blocks of the parties are far apart, what can I call this? An ideological kind of, you know, sort of right, competition, then sort of the mainstream parties then have an incentive to try to form a coalition with sort of ideologically kind of proximate party. And in doing so, they may have an incentive actually to break down demarcation, because kind of in doing so, if you want to form a coalition on the right, you're going to also sort of try to want to include the far right. And this to me characterizes exactly what is happening in France today, where the center right has decided, okay, it's going to go with a kind of the breakdown to form a coalition with the far right. Right. All these attacks are not kind of, you know, the the extremist kind of left is just an effort to consolidate that ideological coalition. So basically, this is the case, the typical case of the centrist coalition. While for the two parties approximate the party, now the center right party here is the kind of the party that has to make a decision. This party will enforce demarcation. Okay. And we'll go with the coalition with the left versus the ideological case that I just discussed where survivor parties survive, the distance between the blocs is so large that survived at this party. I mean, you can think of likable sort of. Right, and, you know, ideologically aligned parties. But this party's now survived because they want to be pivotal and they want to form a government will try to break the demarcation line. Okay. It would be electorally more attractive to go now for the Democratic minimalist, not to enforce demarcation, because you you see yourself as being in competition, ideologically opposed bloc. And that's if you think about it, this is a very simple idea that goes into the Herbert Kegel book. Okay. Now. But it's the same, right? I mean, this in the end, you decide on whether the main variable that affects this decision has to do with the sort of right that the nature of where the other competitors are. So here, right, we're breaking down the demarcation. And we are sort of right in this case the center right party. Okay. Sort of right. Perceived strategy. So here they're not marketing anymore as an ideological position is preferable to a far one. Uh, center Scottish. Okay. So now how do we connect this to the to the reforms that I mentioned at the beginning. So the incentives okay. So the right to choose different set of strategies of defense depend on the coalition configuration. So the French case again go back okay. We had a centrist. We had sort of a I mean this is not good. It has to be flipped okay. Party a far left party. Okay, but the centrist coalition is possible and is sort of right. I mean, the radicals and the sort of right socialists who are closely together, they form the gauche. Okay. They know they can be kind of together, and especially if you're considering the movement generally, most of the electoral system moves against extremists, have been moves away from proportional representation to elements that increase the majority in the coalition partner in the runoffs. Okay, but if you know, you can count on this other on the radicals and even some moderate Republicans, you're going to see that they vote in favor of this and you can form coalitions in the runoffs. Okay. You can block kind of, you know, sort of. Right. The the extremist party through this electoral reform. All you need is sort of right is kind of this, you know, the centrist kind of coalition being large enough. However, in the case where we have two extremist parties kind of and the incentives are weaker. Okay. Because kind of, you know, one of these centrist parties and I

think that's a vital electoral reform that survived, makes me coordinate with my kind of, you know, ideological sort of proximate parties may actually also induce the other kind of camp to coordinate as well. And so this electoral reform is more risky. And I'm going to show you that these are actually the considerations of the German Social Democrats for why they rejected the electoral reform in the Weimar period. They thought that this is strengthening too much the right. So they were actually the veto player that blocked kind of a far reaching kind of reform, uh, electoral reform environment. But what is here more attractive is some kind of, you know, sort of right in kind of, you know, a party ban or an association ban here, the kind of the Democratic center can hold and survive and punish kind of the extremists on both sides. So if this sort of Democratic majority is strong enough, then we should see, okay, something that I call collective reform. And it's also really interesting, the case for which I have less to show you. But I've been thinking a lot about this case is what happens if you have ideological calling. Okay, so the interesting logic here is that sort of right that parties have really strong incentives. I mean, now you're trying to form the right of parties, trying to form their kind of, you know, the ideological majority on each kind of side of the spectrum. And they have strong incentives to attack the non proximate kind of actor. Right. Then the fascists, the communists. Okay. So like you go for these kind of attacks okay. Against kind of the non proximate extremists in an effort. What is the effort to, to serve to attract voters from your kind of extreme right. There's no new policy because it's really hard for these parties to adopt on anything. They haven't sentenced to break down of the sort of demarcation to their extremist. And so the only thing that we see in these cases are sort of discretionary implementation of existing policies against non proximate extremists. What this means. Basically you target some kind of communists for their immunity. Right. You do things that are directed at individual politicians just to kind of to become be seen as the, as the, you know, as the bearer of the democratic kind of, you know, fight against this extremist. I mean, I Trump today attacking the far left. Right. I mean, this would be an example of that, sort of like the attack on a non proximate party by which you're trying to serve, right, to gain, um, gain electoral. I want to say that I don't want to, uh, in sort of in these cases that, uh, that I've sort of study that aren't empirical basis of this study. There is a lot about external shocks. I mean, the medication doesn't come naturally, especially if the party is uncertain about the distribution of the voters. I mean, it's kind of how many voters am I going to lose if I serve this, this hard drive against the extremist party? And as a result, kind of, you know, external shocks play a very important role. And my best example that I want to give you, new way. Maybe you will be with me instead of like, what happened? The reforms in the post-war German period that led actually to the survey to the ban of the far right SAP. So at that time, in this kind of government, right, the right parties were uncertain about the right strategy towards, uh, the um in fact, Justice Minister Tomas Bela told us that she was ready to stand for legalizing your party with sufficient material in the cabinet. Okay, the demarcation was not necessarily, uh, the chosen strategy. We have the election in Idazoxan. Okay. Where the far right wins eleven percent of the votes. Okay. Right. And where kind of, you know, sort of. Right. I mean, this these parties and again, sort of like the FDP. And then you have just to read the history, the recent history kind of were willing to form electoral coalition so that there was not an issue. I mean, like five, seven years after the fall of fascist. Okay. And it is the external shock. It is the intervention, okay, of John McCloy, the U.S. high commissioner. Okay. Who threatened Konrad Adenauer that he would interfere in them and said he would take their issues in his own hands if the Germans don't behave. That serve right? That the government. Okay. Decided, okay, we're going to go for a banning of we're going to initiate the case of the Constitutional Court. So it was not a done deal at all. And it was in fact, it is sort of, I think in this case kind of, you know, sort of like you and I'm going to Koblenz and after this, get even more evidence from the Justice Ministry, kind of, you know, considerations of this. But if you read the biography of, um, of the actors involved, you're going to see that this is the dynamics that unfold. Okay. So to sum up, there's these three possible cases, centrist coalitions plus the mutation leading to systemic reforms such as coalitions with two parties, two extremist parties leading to collective strategies, and ideological coalitions where not much happens. So I'm going to show you now how I think about sort of this explanatory framework. Uh, and I, um, I walked through some examples, uh, again, that twenty four cases in this, uh, in this study and I, you know, kind of cannot present them all. I mean, it works pretty well in the remaining part of the talk. I will show

you some survey evidence where I'm actually going to validate this, this, uh, model about the utilities. Okay. So here I've already discussed this, right. The sort of right, the first response against kind of the communist parties, the first sort of right extremist party that emerges in the French political system. Importantly, the socialists were deep, deep proportional. I mean, kind of, you know, this had been their important part of their strategy until nineteen ninety one. France introduces a hybrid. Okay, let's give some kind of majority. But this is sort of like a PR system. And this is demarcation and this sort of fear of the communist threat that leads kind of, you know, sort of red socialists to endorse majoritarian election and the leads France will reintroduce a major election in an effort to block the Communist candidate. What can we learn from the discussion of this case in the French parliament, and on the sort of the coalition supporting this reform? It is a centrist coalition, as I mentioned, that includes kind of socialist radicals and left leaning Republican. And if we split the Republicans, this is the. So these are the Catholic Republicans who who know they cannot form a coalition with the radicals. Okay. They are left alone in a sort of in a two round electoral system. So of course they are opposed. So it's a pure election, you know, So the right consideration here. They don't like they like PR more. They don't need to make kind of worry about coalitions with these kind of, you know, with the communists and the far right. This is a kind of a centrist coalition that carries through the kind of the, the reform, uh, in the, the electoral reform and, and with some kind of qualifications, similar things in the sort of right Fourth Republic which I won't, uh, which I won't discuss. However, in the thirties, kind of, you know, France experiences the rise of the far right leagues. Okay. So the right I mean, kind of, you know, this this, uh, this mobilization of veterans, um, and, and veterans associations and this rise of, of street level violence that culminates with their attack on, um, the National Assembly in February of nineteen thirty four. So this is a different case. This is a case, a change in political competition. Now, we have sort of right, uh, right wing groups, and you have extremists in both cases. And in this case, I don't know, France kind of the the French politicians don't play a different instrument. The association then in nineteen thirty five, the basis of the association ban is already late in the sort of in the report that examines kind of, you know, the consequences of sort of this attack on the assembly that survived the February thirty four attack on the Assembly and served with the conclusion that the far right leagues pose a threat to the Republic, and the recommendation to propose the solution of of the far right list. Now, this report itself is politically contested. Uh, okay. So at the center right, politicians leave kind of this this commission. And in the end, it is something that is being kind of proposed just by, sort of by the radicals and the socialists, uh, at that time. So which leads them to, uh, a kind of threat to, uh, uh, to a ban, uh, to the proposal to introduce the association. And I want to say that the government that introduces this is the last kind of center right government before the popular. So this is a center, right? This is not a socialist government, okay? This proposes this law that is in place even today in France. Okay. So the right to come up with the way is a very militant democracy way to come up with a way for the state to act preemptively, okay, to intervene and dissolve associations. Okay. Whose symbols, internal structural military style organization conferred that combat group of private militias. The process again, is they take this out of the sphere of the courts and allow the government okay to serve right now to initiate the recommendation, conditional on advisory of opinion of the highest court and the coalition. Supporting this is a centrist is a centrist coalition that includes radical socialist, socialist and moderate Republicans. So in a way similar to the PR reform, what is really interesting on this occasion is that we see, in a way, very different visions of militant democracy are being, you know, sort of proposed at at the point. So the, the communists sort of think that sort of right, that that right is only on the right should not be on the left. So, so the right. So the the law should not be written in a neutral way. Okay. Um, they want so they condemn the neutral wording in the bill as a delaying tactic. And they also want to name the actual leagues. Okay. That's sort of like that constituted democratic as in the body of the law is is defeated. I was surprised that on this occasion. Right. Socialists still supported this proposal, but it doesn't, uh, carry kind of a majority in the parliament. We also have this sort of counter proposal on the right. These are the right Republicans of the non-democratic Republicans. Okay. Who actually want to allow the leagues to continue. Okay. Sort of like if the leagues kind of, you know, renounce violence and they should not be banned. Okay. And so they still kind of, you know, the government is given too much power. Okay. But as you see here, we see some of the typical left right

divide. And again this amendment is not supported. And in the end the compromise solution which is a socialist solution okay, is a proactive militant democracy solution that gives the solution power as an impersonal legal instrument against any future enemy of the Republic, providing a clearer definition of the target than than that supporting the reform. So now the crucial difference. I'm going to turn to this because I was obsessed for six months trying to understand why sort of right by Germany was different, and why they sort of read the proposal to change the electoral systems didn't work in Weimar. Okay. So the critical difference, I guess, is sort of right in France, kind of, you know, sort of. Right. The extremist parties enter sequentially. First the communists and then the fascists. In Germany, you have the threats on both sides from the very beginning, from the formation of the Republic. And as a result, kind of, you know, the Democratic center which tries to hold his nose sort of choice at the beginning. But to go from this collective strategy, the the Republic Gazettes, okay, that, uh, that sort of. Right. Uh, that, uh, you know, uh, provides an assertion that in the end fails for a variety of reasons. But let me just start with the electoral reform case. Electoral reform is on the agenda, okay. For from nineteen twenty four until the end of the theory, it is advanced. And the parties who really want the Who behave in a way like the French socialists are that standpoint. And they, they pay okay, they see their threat okay, on the right, and they think they would do much better on under a majoritarian system. They have two objections. Okay. So the right one is that the extremist benefited from proportional representation because most of the deputies were elected, were benefiting from the redistribution of seats, but were not actually winning districts, and also survived. The lists were had a problem because they allowed the extremist parties to hide the demos. No one knew who the politician was. I mean, kind of in a sense, they were on top of the list. Okay. So. Right. So the only remedy was a sort of was a return to the majoritarian system. And this is right. The evidence which I found in the Army, I never believed that. How is this possible? And if you look here, like the last five years, most of the deputies, twelve out of thirteen are elected through the, uh, to the sort of ice list to the sort of not through not so this is sort of motivated, actually kind of this idea that if we do this, then sort of. Right, I mean, this may be a solution. And so, so, so beginning with the nineteen twenties, kind of, you know, we see these proposals the most developed one, the one that sort of advanced furthest, is sort of, um, in the government, okay. Where there is actually a draft of reform that seeks to abolish party lists and the large multi-member districts and approximate as closely as possible the former single member electoral system. However, the government recognises that it doesn't have the constitutionally required two thirds majority that was needed to abolish proportional representation altogether. So they came up with a very clever idea that we're going to just do a mix of majoritarian and proportional representation, where we're going to keep the majoritarian, we're going to increase the number of seats, allow for the right for these kind of, you know, kind of, you know, sort of politicians to win in these single member districts. But we're going to keep a proportional kind of element at the end. Okay. So. Right, so that the reform doesn't look like a complete overhaul, but just as a, as a full as a sort of something that that could kind of bend the path. And the only opposition came from the SBA, which never was willing to change its position on, on electoral reform and and for for the reasons that I sort of alluded to here. One is that, you know, when they were winning from from proportional representation, clearly they were uh. Uh, but also because they believe that the system struggles, the ability of right parties to coordinate. So, so if you're an ideologically polarized system, so you have this bigger fear and you don't have likely kind of coalition partners on your side like the French socialist had with the radicals, the yesterday's also. Okay, who are kind of coalescing in runoff is not clear. So maybe in small districts, okay. And as a result, the right is is going to become a right versus left kind of, you know, competition. So although I'm showing that the opposition varied across kind of coalitions, it never sort of made it to the parliament. And so it was it was defeated. I will, uh, just briefly, okay, show that sort of right that the law protecting the Republic was a centrist coalition. As discussed, I mean, as I mentioned before, right. The government was sort of like the most left wing kind of, you know, government of. Right, with a large shift of deputies. Okay. There's a huge discussion which I don't want to spend much time on because I need to go to the last part on the sort of like how militant sanctions against sort of associations should be structured and celebrate the strong kind of left the right Cambridge because of, you know, um, the SP they wanted initially, okay, just to sanction the right but not the left, similar to France. The

point is here that the adoption of the Republic Protection law. Okay. So again, we see the centrist coalition in in the final kind of, you know, sort of like a support. Let's get it. Now the default in the committees is a supporter of them, is actually giving very important input into the law. But a lot of their their split a lot of the parties abstain. So in the end, you know, we cannot say that, that the, you know, that the liberals were part of this of the support. So finally, the days of immunity in Panama, which is uh, was again, as I said, the the case that motivated this whole study is sort of collected this database. So it's hard to see. But let me give you the habit. Right. So it's a lot of cases okay. Come to the Parliament because the ports initiate uh, these spaces. Right. So we were talking about these extremist politicians, both communists and um. Um, and uh, sort of initially, you know, and, and then they are there, but most of them don't get resolved. Right. The Parliament doesn't take an issue. And sort of immunity is never sorted right back to making. And these politicians that are they become so disruptive. I've just published this paper on parliamentary disruption. They're the ones that are actually blocking kind of, you know, sort of Parliament from working and from function. And as a result, very late in time, the SPD is becoming concerned that sort of immunity is a sort of right is being misused. And that is being kind of is becoming parliamentary immunity. That quantity has turned into quality. One can now rightly speak of a dangerous perforation. Again, the countries from deputies in such large numbers wish to shield themselves from prosecution using the immunity. This is the best deputy in the relevant committee. And so they changed the rules. But very late and only in the nineteen thirties, allowing kind of, you know, sort of right or tools or right to revoke the immunity. Uh, of the right of the politicians that are being served, the requests that are coming from from the courts. Uh, okay. So it is sort of like a very, um, of a sort of a late change in strategy that runs, unfortunately, very late because kind of between nineteen thirty, nineteen thirty two, I think many of the rights that means it's only like twenty parts. But by then Parliament had already kind of collapsed into Fourth Republic. Just to show you that this is the same logic, the majoritarian dynamic that I described in the third is also a sort of right working in the, in the fourth. So let me just briefly conclude with sort of trying to understand okay. So right how high. Right. So, so the the explanation is I'm proposing has two steps. One, the party has to decide whether or not to demarcate. Two than it does one of these sort of. Right. So first we need to understand when and why do parties demarcate. And two voters actually support demarcation. And you may think this is a simple question because you have talked to your other Democratic friends and who also think that this is a good thing. Okay. So, um, so we are trying actually to sort of try to understand this empirically. This is because it is without a student profile. So it is hard to isolate from other kind of characteristics of a government. Right. So the composition of the majority, the identity of the prime minister, the policies and so on and so forth. So for this, we need a conjoint experiment to separate kind of all these various dimensions and to just to separate out sort of demarcation, um, separating the very simple way. I mean, maybe I'm overdoing it. Well, okay. Assuming that the coalition supports a policy and then it's the same kind of, you know, sort of, right, support for the same policy, but it also announces that it's never going to cooperate with the far right. This will be an example where demarcation is stated, but we are. So we're just taking this gap between the support of the policy and the same sort of policy without demarcation. And that to me is the demarcation premium. And we really need to see how big this is. And we need I think parties need to sort of measure this constantly to understand the support. This is three thousand respondents is very well balanced okay. Across kind of, you know, uh, states across all German states stratified by gender, age and bundesland. And this is how it looks like in the on the screen of the respondents. Right. So we give them the profiles of two possible coalitions. We're telling them, okay. So these were the likely coalitions this field before the election. So sort of right at that time it was possible that the FDP would sort of pass the threshold. But now everything is kind of randomized conditionally and that sort all right. Policies. Restrictions on illegal migrations. Restrictions on illegal migration and demarcation on Anzac Day. So I'm only looking at this gap. Now every respondent sees five of these pairs. So in total I have ten observations. So I have thirty thousand. A lot of data that allows me actually kind of gives me kind of, you know, kind of statistical power. All right. So this is sort of how the attributes are being kind of randomized here. Uh, okay. And sometimes I have I'm also randomizing whether they are or not. What what these are not just okay. Uh, what are they? Enforce the demarcation, but also of cooperation. Now, the good news, okay, is there is a

communication. So this is among mainstream voters, right? So those respondents that vote for a party. So these are six percent of a higher. The likelihood that kind of a polish on that analysis okay. The medication The six percent higher compared to the I, only comparing the exactly same kind of policy without the announcement of the mayor. But the interesting for me is that you see this. It's very circular spots. And this is sort of rather this is sort of the intuition of the model is that the costs of the mutation are asymmetric across kind of parties. Right. The high for the left, as you would expect I presume there may of real and voters here. It's sort of like this almost fifty percent okay. So right. So they are really rewarding okay. This kind of strategy. But this is really what I think we should focus on more, which is sort of right for the center right voters is indistinguishable from zero. There are a lot of centrist voters who do not see any value, okay, in, in sort of such a, such a poll. So this costly this sort of I'm trying to say the closer you are to the right, um, ideologically the costlier, um, it is for you. And again here we can see it even it is negative, but it's already very here. Very. Just the policy position on migration. Okay. More or less. Okay. We see that survive for the centrist voters. Okay. Who are in favor of migration kind of you know, there is a Denmark then there is a mega there's a cost also like one learns a lot. So I had the open ended question, what do you think when you hear that run, Mauer okay. It's a lot of really interesting data, which I haven't fully analyzed. I'm just giving you the workout here. But we see differences across Park. Here's what the theory is with the K borders. Okay, okay. Not not the same image on the left somehow I know okay. Yeah okay. Very, very different evaluation. Uh, of of this uh, of this strategy. So micro results consistent with the idea of centrist coalition. Okay. Uh. All right. Okay. No demarcation premium for today. And say so. Demarcation costs for voters with restricted preferences on migration. So I just this is the beginning of my project. So I just want to say I want to develop this argument about the electoral coalitions and how they influence the theoretical considerations about different policies of democratic defense. Or and suggestions are welcome. This idea of ideological versus centrist coalition that seems to be explaining, well, the kind of the, uh, the, the cases that I had here and also this I want to explore this further as, again, as I said, I believe that, uh, sort of demarcation is much more fragile as as political strategy is much more fragile than France and Germany. Why? Because of the ideological coalitions that have formed rather than sort of rather than that. Right. The way I understand the current French politics is that the right is really sort of trying to break down the end of the fight and trying to solve it, and it's all it's individualized attacks that I just mentioned as a sort of as a strategy on. Investigating him and so on and so forth. Try to increase this kind of this distance to the center left block and trying to survive. So it should not function, at least for center right voters now, uh, in, in the upcoming election. And I also think that sort of right that we need to to talk more about the costs of it. It's not a free lunch. It's not something that all parties, you know, love. Its cost varies across parties and parties. All of them need to internalize this needs to be more openly discussed. And so it is easier for the center left and the center right to announce this sort of right. But if the center left doesn't fully internalize the cost of the medication, then celebrated, the policy may be more fragile than than the others. So this one I have to say. Yeah. Thanks so much for this.