MPIfG Working Paper
99/7, Mai 1999
The EU and Its Member-States: Institutional Contrasts and
Vivien A. Schmidt
Vivien A. Schmidt is Professor of International Relations
at Boston University. Together with Fritz W. Scharpf she jointly directs the
conference project "Adjustment of National Employment and Social Policy
Systems to the Internationalized Economy" at the Max Planck Institute for
the Study of Societies, where she was a visiting researcher in the fall of 1998.
The EU is a supranational governance organization which is quasi-federal in
institutional structure and quasi-pluralist in policymaking processes. As such,
it has had a significant impact on all member-states' institutional structures,
whether federal or unitary, and their policymaking processes, whether statist or
corporatist. But it has had a greater impact on countries such as France and
Britain, which are unitary and statist, than on a federal, corporatist country
such as Germany, where there is better goodness of fit. The problems of
democratic legitimacy, which occur not only at the EU level but also at the
national level, are therefore again greater in France and in Britain than in
Although the EU has generally subordinated all
member-states' institutions to its own in similar ways, these have been
experienced quite differently by member-states.
This is because of differences among member-states' institutional structures
that affect which branches or units of government have what sorts of power over
which kinds of decisions and in policymaking processes that allow access and
influence to different actors at different stages of the process and enforce
decisions in different ways. As such, the EU's quasi-federal institutional
structures have had a greater impact on member-states with unitary institutional
structures, by altering the traditional balance of powers among branches and
levels of government, than to those with federal institutional structures, where
the traditional balance of powers has been largely maintained. Moreover, the
EU's quasi-pluralist policymaking processes have impinged more on
member-states with statist policymaking processes, by diminishing state autonomy
in formulation and flexibility in implementation, than those with corporatist
ones, because they have been more able to maintain their flexibility in
implementation. And this has in turn raised greater questions for democratic
legitimacy and accountability in unitary, statist polities than in federal,
Thus, this paper has two interrelated arguments: 1) that
the EU has quasi-federal institutional structures and quasi-pluralist
policymaking processes; and 2) that although the EU imposes general adaptational
pressures on all member-states' institutions, it nevertheless has a
differential impact on member-states depending upon whether they are unitary or
federal in structure and whether they are statist or corporatist in processes.
The Institutional Structures of the EU
The EU's governance structure is difficult to define,
since it conforms to neither of the traditional forms of national institutional
structures, whether unitary or federal, although it is closest to the latter.
Like most federal systems, the EU's institutional structures exhibit both a
vertical division of powers between central and lower level units and a
horizontal division of powers between executive, legislature, and judiciary. In
the EU, however, there is much less vertical division given the greater
independent powers of the EU's member-states and their greater control over
the central governing apparatus; and there is also less horizontal division,
given the "dynamic confusion of powers" between the Council of
Ministers, the European Parliament, the European Union Commission, and the
European Court of Justice in the EU. To understand the differences fully,
however, it is first necessary to consider national institutional structures,
both federal and unitary.
Federalism is ordinarily defined as a system with a
formally established, vertical division of power such that the central governing
body incorporates subnational units in its decision procedures on a
constitutionally-entrenched basis. In
federal systems such as the United States as well as Canada and Spain, moreover,
subnational units generally have independent legislative powers of their own as
well as separate domains of competence. In some federal systems such as the
German, however, instead of this jurisdictional separation of responsibilities,
there is a functional division in which subnational governments participate in
national legislation and are charged with the implementation of nationally
The unitary state, by contrast, typically has no
constitutionally-guaranteed, vertical division of power, and has formal control
over subnational units which have at best limited legislative powers, even
though they may have substantial autonomy based on national legislation or
informal practice. In recent years, as central governments everywhere have
increasingly devolved power, functions, and resources to the periphery, this
picture of the unitary state has softened, although more in some countries (e.g.,
Italy as of the l970s and even more so Spain, which essentially federalized
itself in the early l980s) than others (e.g., France even with the reforms of
the l980s). But the central government nevertheless retains at least potential
control over the periphery, if only because without the protection of
constitutional guarantees, that which it has given to subnational authorities,
it can always take back (as was the case with the recentralization of local
government in Great Britain in the Thatcher years).
Given these definitions, the EU clearly has nothing in
common with the unitary state. Instead of strong, central control by a single
level of government from which emanates all legislation for the periphery, the
EU is weak in central control, given that the "periphery" of
member-states is also the ultimate central authority in the EU through the
Council of Ministers and the European Council, and that the member-states still
formulate much of their own national legislation (even though this increasingly
means transposing EU directives into national law) and implement all of it (even
if with oversight by the EU Commission and the ECJ). At best, therefore, the EU
could be described as a collection of unitary states acting in supranational
concert, and which therefore more closely resembles a confederacy, as "state-centric,"
intergovernmentalist international relations theorists argue.
But such a depiction of EU decision-making as a
confederacy in which "states," represented by state executives, are
the primary movers in the EU, and where the state is something of a national
level "black box" out of which preferences emerge to be mediated and
modified at the supranational level and into which the resulting decisions
return, to be imposed on national constituencies by the executive, is flawed.
More to the point is the fact that state-centric theorists do little to account
for the multifarious ways in which institutional and other actors at EU,
national, and subnational levels interrelate, and which make the institutional
structure of the EU more akin to a federal system
characterized by "multi-level governance"
than any supranational confederation of states (except when it comes to the
negotiation of the major EU treaties).
But although there is no question that the EU resembles
more closely the model of a federal system than that of a confederacy, let alone
a unitary state, it is its own particular brand of federalism, and not as close
as one might assume to the federalism of the United States. Germany is perhaps a
more apt comparison. In Germany as in
Europe, policymaking effectiveness depends upon negotiations among politically
autonomous governments. But in Germany, the federal government has political and
fiscal resources to impose its will in ways that the European Commission does
not, and can depend upon a shared national politics and public opinion; viable
political parties to balance out state power; and a high degree of economic and
cultural homogeneity, none of which exist in Europe at large.
For Europe, in fact, democratic legitimacy remains at issue in a way it does not
in national federal systems because of the heterogeneity of populations with
little common sense of European identity, let alone a European "politics,"
a European party system, or a European public opinion.
Moreover, European federalism is a "balancing act"
between the representation of territorial and nonterritorial interests, with
territorial interests much more fully embedded in every institution than in the
United States or Germany: National governments appoint the judges of the ECJ and
the commissioners of the EU Commission; national ministers compose the Council
of Ministers; and members of the European Parliament are elected by national
electorates. And these national governments are involved in the enforcement as
much as the initiation of "federal" policies through regulations
enforced by national governments and directives that are transposed into
national law by national parliaments.
The result is a much greater confusion of roles for officials of the EU and its
member-states than that found among officials in central and lower level
governments in most federal systems. And this in turn can lead to problems of
accountability, as officials may feel split loyalties and contradictory
responsibilities with regard to EU interests and national interests.
Finally, much as for the lower level governments in a
federal state such as the United States, the autonomy of the member-states of
the EU has been in a long-term process of erosion, even if in recent years this
has slowed in the US with devolution in some sectors, or in the EU with concern
for "subsidiarity" as integration accelerated. One major difference
between the EU and other federal systems like that of the US, however, is that
the rise in the EU's powers has been in large part the doing of the
member-states themselves through unanimous agreement in successive treaties
which over the years have defined and redefined the ever-increasing powers of
the EU in ever-widening domains, rather than as in many federal systems through
a process of incremental expansion in federal powers to areas not explicitly
constitutionally established.[ ]In consequence, questions about the
legitimacy of federal expansion in powers to the detriment of those of lower
level governments, which have been a major source of controversy in federal
systems such as the US where the defense of states' rights has been a
recurring theme, have not been as significant a problem for the EU. However,
there have also been areas in which EU institutional structures have expanded
treaty-granted powers to other domains not explicitly laid out in the treaties.
And these have sometimes raised questions of legitimacy (as with the 48 hour
week work rule applied to Britain, despite its opt-out of the social chapter),
although as often as not, the legitimacy problem has been resolved after the
fact, through incorporation in subsequent treaties (as, for example, with the
principle of mutual recognition established by the ECJ in l979 but included in
the Single European Act of l986). Of course, legitimacy can also be at issue
even when EU action remains perfectly in keeping with the Treaties, but is
nonetheless seen as unjustified or excessive to a particular member-state (e.g.,
in competition policy decisions such as the de Havilland case protested by the
French, or the decision on aid to VW in Lower Saxony protested by the Germans).
Although not part of the definition of federalism, which
limits itself to the vertical division of power, the horizontal division of
power, commonly known as the "separation of powers," is also a
characteristic of most federal systems, whether the United States, Canada, or
Germany. What this means is that the federal executive has relatively little
autonomy given a legislature and judiciary each with its own independent
authority. This is in contrast to unitary states such as France and Britain,
where the centralization of power at the national level also gives the executive
a great deal of autonomy, with the legislature and judiciary largely
subordinated to it. Even unitary states, however, have some degree of separation
of powers, and some more than others, whether because the legislature has
greater powers of oversight over the executive (as in Britain and Denmark vs.
France); because the judiciary has greater independent authority (as in Britain
vs. France), even if it is ultimately subordinated to another power such as the
legislature (as in Britain); or because the executive is unable to exercise its
authority due to unstable coalition governments (as in Italy before recent
electoral reforms) rather than strong, single party governments (as in the
"Westminster model" of Great Britain) or strong coalition governments
(as in France and to a lesser extent in Italy today).
Federal systems, of course, also differ from one another,
with some having a greater separation of powers than others, whether because the
legislature has more political independence (especially in the United States,
when the majority in one or both houses differs from the president's, but also
in Germany, when the majority in the upper house differs from the lower which
forms the governmental majority); because the judiciary has a longer and
stronger tradition of independence (as in Germany by contrast with Belgium or
Spain); or because the executive is less able to exercise what power it does
have due to internal divisions in coalition governments (e.g., Belgium and to a
lesser extent Germany). But these differences are nothing compared to those
between the EU and most national federal systems, let alone unitary systems.
Instead of the clearly-defined, constitutionally-fixed and
formally unchanging separation of powers between executive, legislative, and
judicial branches of government, as found in the US or German federal systems,
the EU exhibits a "dynamic confusion of powers." This confusion
involves not only the lack of traditional separation among the various EU
institutions but also the mixing up of their very roles. The legislative
function is more the domain of the Council of Ministers - which could be taken
for the executive given that it is made up of national executives - than of the
directly-elected legislature, the European Parliament, although it has been
increasing in legislative powers in recent years. The executive function is more
the purview of the bureaucracy, the EU Commission, which has powers of
initiation and implementation, than of the seeming executive, the Council of
Ministers, to which it reports; and the judicial function, although the only one
performed by the expected institution, the European Court of Justice, encroaches
on the executive and the legislative functions through the judiciary's activism.
This confusion of powers causes problems with regard to
traditional understandings of democratic accountability that go way beyond the
problems of national federal or unitary systems. Compared to other federal
systems, where the balance of powers generally serves as a check on different
branches of government and a guarantee of democratic accountability, the
confusion of powers in the EU means that it has fewer checks on its different
institutions or guarantees of accountability. And these only add to the problems
of democratic legitimacy typically referred to as the EU's "democratic
deficit," given a directly-elected parliament which, unlike in most federal
systems, is the weakest of the three branches.
Although the increasing powers of the European Parliament
with regard to budgetary matters, co-decision, and most recently veto over
appointments to the Commission have gone some way to enabling it to become the
locus of democratic accountability, the institutional structure which gives the
un-elected members of the Commission powers of initiation and formulation and
the nationally-elected members of the Council of Ministers powers of approval
ensures that, short of major institutional restructuring, the problems of
democratic legitimacy will remain. Moreover, even if one were to argue that the
Council of Ministers, as the representative of the nationally elected executive
and also involved in a variety of ways in the legislative process, provides some
modicum of intergovernmental democratic legitimacy, it adds to the problems of
democratic accountability. These result not only from the lack of transparency
of the Council of Ministers, given secrecy rules, but also the lack of
significant democratic control of the Council from either the European
Parliament or national parliaments.
The Commission also suffers from problems of accountability, although here the
issues are related more to questions of corruption and cronyism, as the report
from the Parliamentary commission which led to the resignation of the Commission
One way out of these problems, of course, is institutional
reform. But how? Any solution short of instituting a truly federal system, which
does not seem to be in the cards, would be likely to create other problems of
legitimacy or accountability of one sort or another. For example, if the
European Parliament were to gain approval powers beyond its current codecision
ones, this would decrease member-state power as represented in the Council of
Ministers, and thereby undermine the traditional intergovernmental bases of EU
legitimacy. If on top of this the Commission were to be directly elected, or
even only elected by Parliament from among its members, this would even further
reduce the powers of the Council of Ministers and the traditional grounds of
legitimacy. This would be acceptable, of course, if the European Parliament (EP)
concomitantly gained in representative legitimacy, that is, if it were generally
accepted as speaking for European citizens. This, however, is still a long way
away, given nationally-based EP elections that often focus on national rather
than European issues, and the still-national basis of citizens' views of
democratic representation and legitimacy.
Most importantly, however, any such increases in the
powers of the European Parliament, or other institutional structures, would also
serve to reduce the powers of national institutional structures. And whatever
the problems for legitimacy and accountability at the EU level, they are nothing
compared to the problems generated at the national level by the increasing
encroachment of EU powers over national decision-making institutions.
The Impact of EU Institutional Structures on Member-States
In the course of European integration, the EEC/EC/EU's
institutional structures have increasingly taken precedence over the national,
diminishing national executives' autonomy in national policymaking; usurping
national parliamentary powers of initiative and/or review; subordinating
national judicial authority to the European Court of Justice; and reducing
subnational units' often newly-gained autonomy. In this, however, the European
Union's quasi-federal institutional structure has been more disruptive to
unitary member-states, where the EU has served to undermine traditional
executive autonomy and to diminish legislative power while promoting national
court independence and subnational autonomy, than to federal member-states,
which have largely maintained the balance between executive, legislature, and
judiciary as well as between center and periphery. As a result, unitary
member-states have had to confront greater problems with regard to democratic
accountability and legitimacy than federal member-states.
In the exercise of its powers, the quasi-federal EU has
not only reduced the powers of national level institutions generally, it has
also generally affected the balance of powers between executive, legislature,
and judiciary and diminished central control over subnational units. The EU has,
above all else, reduced the traditional powers of member-states' legislatures,
as EU institutions have increasingly taken these over in a wide variety of areas.
National legislatures' relative powers next to national executives have also
concomitantly diminished, given the executives' role in transnational
policymaking and the parliaments' lack of authoritative power over national
executives' policy decisions made in the Council of Ministers.
This loss in relative power to the executive is only increased by the fact that
in domains covered by EU decision-making, their contribution to government is
less and less one of initiation and deliberation and more and more solely one of
translating into national law EU directives elaborated in the EU Commission and
approved by national executives in the Council.
While national parliaments have lost power in consequence
of the EU, some have argued that national executives have gained with respect
not just to the national legislature but also societal interests, through the
"strengthening of the state."
But although one might be able to claim this for the most heroic of policies,
such as Treaty negotiations, one cannot for most other cases, which is the bulk
of EU decision-making. This is because what the state (meaning the executive)
may gain in power over national legislatures and some national actors, it loses
in autonomy with respect to supranational actors (not only other governmental
actors, as one of fifteen in the Council of Ministers, but also non-governmental
actors that have increasing access to EU decision-making) and in control over
domestic institutional actors (given the growing powers of the judiciary and
independence of subnational actors) as well as over the aggregation of domestic
interests (in particular those domestic actors with access to the EU
The loss of control by the executive over other
governmental actors as a result of EU institutional structures is most apparent
with regard to the judiciary. The development of the ECJ in particular has
contributed to the courts' growing powers even as it has subordinated national
court systems generally to itself. For in expanding its own powers, the ECJ has
also served to expand those of national courts, especially the lower courts
through their ability to seek "authoritative guidance" from the ECJ
and thereby to change national law while circumventing their own national
judicial hierarchy. Subnational
authorities, too, have gained in independence with respect to the executive,
although this is probably more related to internal, decentralizing reforms that
diminished central control over the periphery than to increasing European access
(through the Committee of the Regions) and resources (through the structural
funds and other programs). But at the same time that European integration has
added to subnational authorities' growing independence, it has also diminished
their autonomy, in particular with regard to EU rules governing a whole range of
areas that regions must implement.
What is more, the significance of such gains and losses in
autonomy, power, independence, or control differ in unitary states from federal
states. In federal states, where the executive has never had much autonomy while
the legislature and judiciary already benefit from a constitutionally-fixed
separation of powers and subnational units enjoy constitutionally-guaranteed
autonomy, EU incursions on national powers have not significantly altered the
balance of powers, and therefore the relative strength or weakness of the
executive, although this did demand some internal readjustments. By contrast, in
unitary states, where power is mostly concentrated in the executive which
predominates over legislature and judiciary as well as over subnational units,
the traditional balance of power has been altered in consequence of the loss of
executive autonomy and the increasing separation of powers, thereby actually
weakening the executive. Not only does the EU not generally strengthen the state,
then, it actually reduces the relative "strength" of the state much
more in unitary states than in federal states.
For a unitary state such as France, the notion of the
strengthening of the state is an especially hollow concept. There is no doubt
that the traditionally weak legislature, which never had much independent power
as long as the government had a solid majority, has become even weaker. But to
call this a strengthening of the state carries little weight, given how
all-powerful (at least with regard to the legislature) the executive has
traditionally been. More to the point is the fact that the formerly seemingly
all-powerful executive has lost its virtual monopoly in policymaking, given not
only the increasing importance of the EU level in policy formulation but also
the growing independence at the national level of the traditionally subordinated
judiciary and subnational authorities.
The strengthening of the state is also a hollow concept
for Britain. The traditionally strong British executive has lost autonomy with
regard to EU level policymaking, although comparatively less than in France
because of its opt-outs from various EU policies under Thatcher and Major. At
the national level, moreover, the executive's gains over a Parliament which it
has always controlled as long it maintained a solid majority and party
discipline are no more significant than in France, even though the British
Parliament has always had a more powerful role than the French in terms of
oversight and representation of public concerns. What is more, the traditionally
more independent British judiciary has simply become more so. Only over
subnational authorities has the executive substantially increased its control
(in the Thatcher years, although devolution is now beginning under Blair).
Finally, the strengthening of the state is an equally
hollow concept for federal states such as Germany, albeit for different reasons.
Not only has the federal state never had much autonomy to begin with, given the
separate powers of the judiciary, legislature, and subnational units, but the
increases in executive power as a result of the EU have been countered by
Parliament-led adjustments that served to reinforce its own powers and
concomitantly those of the Länder which had eroded as a result of European
The differential effects of the EU on unitary as opposed
to federal states also have differing consequences for questions of democratic
legitimacy and accountability. It stands to reason that federal states have had
fewer lasting problems with democratic legitimacy and accountability than
unitary states as a result of the expansion in the powers of the EU, since they
have readjusted the relative powers of the executive and legislature to ensure
against any permanent shift in power balance. But this is only part of the
explanation. Because federal states such as Germany operate with notions of
"compounded representation" similar to those of the EU,
where no one institutional body has control over the decision-making process and
different bodies share responsibility for its outcome, they are likely to adjust
more readily to having an added level of shared decision-making with no clear
lines of responsibility (once they have accepted the legitimacy of that added
level, of course).
By contrast, the adjustment is likely to be much harder
for unitary states such as France and Britain, which operate with more simple
notions of representation, where the executive is expected to be in control over
the decision-making process and solely responsible for its outcome, whether it
is the French Jacobin notion of the executive as representative of the French
nation, one and indivisible, or the British notion of parliamentary sovereignty
as embodied in the executive. Add to this the fact that the executive has lost
significant control, whether because of its loss of autonomy with respect to the
EU or the changes in the balance of power regarding the judiciary and
subnational units, and the legitimacy and accountability problems for unitary
states can be seen as much more significant than for federal states. Here, even
if the legitimacy of the EU level has been accepted, individual EU level
decisions which challenge the national executive's assumed control can always
lead to questions about the executive's representation of the nation and,
therefore, national democratic legitimacy.
Complicating this even further, however, are the differing
patterns of policymaking between the EU level and the national. And here,
although EU policymaking processes in some cases alleviate problems of
legitimacy resulting from the EU institutional structure, they also add to the
legitimacy problems at national level.
EU Policymaking Processes
European integration has generated change not only in
member-state institutional structures but also in their policymaking processes.
And just as European institutions do not fit any national model of institutional
arrangement, although they are closest to the federal, so European policymaking
processes do not fit any national model of policymaking, although they are
generally closest to the pluralism of the federal United States, and have been
called a model of "transnational pluralism."
Like the US, the EU's pluralist policymaking processes tend to be open to
interest group influence in the formulation process and regulatory in their
implementation. But the EU is somewhat less open to interest influence in
formulation, given the gate-keeping role of its civil servants; more cooperative
in its interrelationships; and more delegatory in implementation, given the role
of member-states in transposing and administering EU directives.
This said, it is important to reiterate that no
traditional, national pattern of state-society relations or style of state and
societal interaction quite describes the complexities of the EU, given the
openness of a policymaking process managed by Commission officials in an
anticipatory and cooperative manner in which interest representation fits no
readily recognizable national form, and is "sectorally structured and
linked with a complex and often rather incoherent issue network of groups or
organizations across Europe and beyond."
The EU is, above all, characterized by practices that are generally more
flexible, heterogeneous, and issue-specific than in any corresponding national
context, while the unpredictability
of the policy agenda in the EU, the result of a "system of uncertain
agendas, shifting networks and complex coalitions,"
makes it akin to a "garbage can model" of policymaking.
But although policymaking in the European Union is
difficult to categorize in traditional ways, it is not impossible. The closest
match, as we have already noted, is not with any European member-state but,
rather, with the United States, with its ideal-typical pluralist pattern of
policymaking. In pluralist systems, societal interests tend to be allowed into
the policy formulation process, by exerting influence primarily through lobbying,
but kept out of policy implementation, which is regulatory or legalistic in
application. This system seems to flourish primarily where federal institutional
structures are also present, since they tend to allow societal interests plural
points of access via the different branches, units, and levels of government.
Such access at the formulation stage ensures that societal interests have
multiple opportunities to affect policy outcomes, whether to help set the
legislative agenda, to elaborate the technical details of legislation, or to
establish legal precedents - but not to affect policy implementation. At the
implementation stage, the state in principle maintains an arms' length
relationship with societal interests, and the rules are to be applied without
What distinguishes EU pluralism from that of the United
States is the nature of interest group access and influence at the policy
formulation stage, which is more selective and controlled as well as less
political or driven by money in the EU than it is in the US. The differences
also extend to the content and character of interrelationships among actors,
which tends to be more cooperative in the EU rather than competitive, as it
tends to be in the US.
To begin with, the EU policy formulation process is more
insulated from the pressures of undue influence and less vulnerable to the
politics of party or money, given an EU Commission with apolitical EU civil
servants rather than partisan legislators and their staffs, and with a greater
emphasis on the technical than the political in decision-making. In the EU,
lobbying is a highly technical affair, as civil servants make every effort to
hear all sides and to base their decisions on purely technical and economic
arguments. For European civil servants, the main justification for any policy is
practicability and efficiency in promoting collective gains for the EU as a
whole. For national politicians and
civil servants, whether American or European, by contrast, the policy along with
its justification may often sacrifice efficiency for more political goals.
The EU Commission also suffers less from the problems of
agency capture or "iron triangles" that are found in the US pluralist
process, given the wide range of interests and actors involved in any given
policy initiative which enable it to refuse interest groups' unwanted or
unrealizable claims. It protects
itself from such problems not only through its openness to interest
representations but also through its active recruiting of representations, and
by putting itself at the center of a vast "issue network" which
enables it to choose among a much wider range of ideas and proposals than is
often available to national governments.
This doesn't entirely guard against the undue influence of industry experts,
of course, and the dangers of quasi-clientelistic relationships.
But since Commission officials are not elected politicians who have electoral
coffers to fill, the dangers are lesser - although cronyism and favoritism
remain a problem (albeit on a lesser scale) given that highest level Commission
officials are often former national elected politicians with debts to repay.
Politics, of course, does play a role in the EU. This is
most evident in the Council of Ministers. But in the Council it is generally the
politics of national interest rather than party or money per se. And the
arguments themselves are more often than not couched in technical terms, even if
they serve as a cover for more political motivations. Only in the European
Parliament could one talk about the politics of party. But here, the parties are
still so underdeveloped and the Parliament itself so lacking in power by
comparison with the Council or Commission, that party politics are barely at
play. Instead, another kind of interest politics is at work, that of public
interest politics focused around groups representing environmental, consumer,
and human rights concerns. This is
not so much because all members of Parliament are necessarily sympathetic to
such issues but because these issues generally have a broader public appeal and
are less well represented in the Commission, and therefore serve to increase
MEPs' political weight and to gain public attention.
But at the same time that the EU's pluralism may be less
politicized than that of the US, it is less "pluralistic" in the kinds
of interests represented as well as in their access and potential influence.
The EU Commission has much greater control over the entire process of interest
representation by comparison with the US, where any interest that organizes
itself is regarded as legitimate so long as it can make itself heard. In the EU,
only those interests the EU Commission chooses to legitimize, and thus allow
into the process, will be heard. This was actually a problem in earlier years
with regard to the access and influence of environmental groups and others - by
contrast with business, which for the most part had ready access. But in more
recent years, it is the Commission itself which has sought to overcome the
problem by expanding its openness to a wide range of interests along with its
transparency. Even so, the Commission remains in control. This is a by-product
of its strategy of gaining information and political support through the
development of networks of advisory committees and working groups made up of
experts, representatives of member-states at national and subnational levels,
and societal interest groups.
The EU's pluralism is also much more closed to citizen
participation than that of the US. Whereas in the United States, grass-roots
campaigns focused on Congress have become a preferred tool of special interest
as well as public interest groups, this has little prospect in the EU. This
results in large measure from the comparative paucity of Europe-wide
non-business organizations but also that the most likely recipients of such
campaigns, EU members of Parliament, have themselves little direct influence on
the policy formulation process (although they can cause problems once a dossier
is well on its way). Targets of such campaigns tend to be nationally-based,
albeit with European functions, most often the national minister voting in the
Council of Ministers. Protests, moreover, and the relatively new
"Eurostrikes," are likely
to have a much greater impact, although it is too early to know how much and in
what ways. Currently, the effect is mainly indirect, as national governments
have tended to be the ones having to deal with their consequences (although this
has been changing as protest increasingly moves to Brussels, in particular in
the case of agriculture).
Thus, the EU system of interest representation in policy
formulation is more controlled and less open than that of the US, although it is
also less subject to the abuses of undue influence. Recent attempts by the
Commission to create more avenues for participation in efforts to increase
legitimacy, moreover, have served to generate counter-weights to what might be
seen as the more one-sided representations of producer interests. But does this
solve the problems that plague US pluralism, in particular the fact that the
policies which emerge from the competitive US interest mediation process may be
far from any public interest, given problems of unequal interest access, undue
special interest influence, and easily influenced legislators? Not entirely,
although the more cooperative, elite-led EU mediation process may result in
policies that promote an intergovernmentally-defined public good based on ideals
laid out in the Treaties. The problem with this public good, however, is that it
is more economic than social in character, and tends to be better able to
promote "negative integration" through the removal of barriers to
trade than the "positive integration" which would be necessary to
ensure against the erosion of the accomplishments of the postwar welfare state.
Finally, whereas the EU's pluralist policy formulation
process may avoid some of the worst problems of the US, even admitting its own
problems with regard to access and representativeness, in the EU's policy
implementation process it courts many more than the US. This is because in the
US, the federal civil servants' implementation of the rules (whether alone, in
tandem with, or in addition to state-level civil servants) are for the most part
done according to the same procedures, and therefore ensure great relative
uniformity in application (the major exception being the new welfare reform of
l996). By contrast, in the EU, the process is more complex, given that
member-states themselves implement regulations as well as transpose directives
into national law and then implement them according to national procedures. This
allows member-states much greater latitude in the interpretation and application
of the rules, which naturally raises questions about the equal application of
the rules, given different regulatory cultures and practices.
But whatever the differences between the EU's model and
the ideal-typical pluralist model of the United States, they are nothing
compared to those between the EU's quasi-pluralist model and the corporatist or
statist models of member-states. And here, the impact of the EU on national
policymaking processes is as significant for questions of democratic
accountability and legitimacy as it is with regard to the clash of institutional
The Impact of EU Policymaking Processes on Member-States
European policymaking processes have increasingly impinged
on national ones generally, diminishing member-states' autonomy in policy
formulation by allowing access and influence to a wider range of actors and
their flexibility in policy implementation by promoting regulatory or legalistic
enforcement patterns. But this has been experienced differently by
member-states, given differences in national policymaking processes which tend
to be either statist or corporatist. By comparison with EU quasi-pluralist
policymaking processes, statist policymaking processes tend ideal-typically to
be more closed to interest influence in policy formulation; more open to
interest accommodation either through administrative discretion or
self-regulatory arrangements; and more conflictual in interactive style, with
decisions often political and generally taken at the top. By comparison with EU
quasi-pluralist policymaking processes, corporatist policymaking processes tend
ideal-typically to be more open to certain "privileged" interests in
policy formulation; more flexible in implementation, by being open to interest
accommodation through joint self-governing arrangements; and more consensual in
style, with decisions less clearly political and rarely taken at the top. In
consequence of these differences, the EU's quasi-pluralist policymaking
processes have tended to impose greater adjustment burdens on statist polities
than on corporatist ones. This is
because whereas in statist polities, the EU's "pluralism" has served
to diminish the state's autonomy in policy formulation and the EU's
regulatory model has reduced its flexibility in implementation, it has had less
effect on corporatist polities, in which the state has never had as much
autonomy in formulation and which have been for the most part allowed to
continue with corporatist implementation processes.
In the statist pattern of state-society relations
characteristic of France (the model for this ideal-type), Britain, and to a much
less extent Italy, societal interests tend to have comparatively little input
into a policy formulation process where the state has great autonomy The
executive in this context ordinarily has the capacity to act unilaterally or
even "heroically." This is because societal interests tend to be
disorganized compared to the greater organization of the state, which is almost
always unitary in structure, with strong executives backed by majoritarian
electoral systems with significant control over the legislature via
parliamentary mechanisms (especially in France) or party discipline (especially
in Britain under Thatcher and Blair), and by an elite, non-politicized state
bureaucracy (in both France and Britain). Where this is not the case, because
the unitary state has a weak executive with unstable coalition governments
elected by proportional representation that lack control over the legislature
either through party discipline or parliamentary mechanisms and that depend upon
a state bureaucracy penetrated by political interests, state paralysis may ensue
(as was true for Italy until recent electoral reforms in the l990s).
But whereas societal interests are generally kept out of
statist policy formulation, they are for the most part allowed into the policy
implementation process, which is generally flexible in application. Such
flexibility may be the result of administrative discretion, where derogation of
the rules is accepted practice, and where the state generally accommodates
societal interests or risks confrontation (in France and even more so in Italy);
or it may be the result of state-sanctioned, self-governing arrangements by
societal interests (more the case in Britain).
Given the pattern of unilateral government action in policy formulation, the
style of state-society interaction is generally conflictual, although more
obviously so in some countries, where protest seems the only way to be heard (as
in France and even more so Italy) than in others, which have a less
confrontational tradition (as in Britain). Because of the style, where a policy
finds high levels of opposition which the state cannot or will not accommodate,
societal mobilization can occur. And in the face of confrontation, the state
often backs down (the pattern in France and Italy). Even where this does not
occur, however, the state may be censured, if only at the ballot box (typically
the pattern in Great Britain).
Within any given statist system, however, some sectors
exhibit different patterns, mostly where societal interests are more highly
organized and mobilized. This is when more everyday policymaking tends to occur,
and accommodation of societal interests appears already at the formulation
stage. Here the relational patterns and interactive styles of state and society
may look more like the cooperative pattern found in the EU pluralist policy
process (as with business in Britain) or like the consensual pattern of
corporatist policy processes (as with agriculture in France). The overall
relationship is still statist, however, to the extent that the state still has
the capacity to impose when it wishes (as with business in Britain during the
Thatcher years), although if it does so it may generate greater confrontation
(as with agriculture in France in the early l980s and in more recent times).
In the corporatist pattern characteristic of the
Netherlands (the original model for the ideal type until the early l980s), the
Scandinavian countries, Austria (the ideal typical model still today), Belgium
(farthest from the ideal), and Germany (a more complicated model given its
federal structure), certain "privileged" societal interests, mainly
business and labor, are brought into both policy formulation and policy
implementation processes. Here, the state generally does not have the capacity
to impose, mainly because however highly organized it may be, that is, even if
it is unitary in structure, it faces equally highly organized or at least
mobilized societal interests. Where it is federal or decentralized in structure,
moreover, the executive's lack of autonomy ensures its inability to impose.
Rather than acting unilaterally, therefore, the state generally seeks to act in
coordination with societal interests. Such coordination allows interests to
influence policy formulation from the inside, by co-devising the policies, and
not just, as in the pluralist relationship, to exert influence from the outside.
Although such coordination may be more efficient and effective in corporatist
systems with unitary political structures than those with federal structures,
given the smaller number of actors, it is always possible as long as
representatives of state and society are amenable to reaching agreement (and if
they are legally required to do so, as in federal Germany). Agreement, moreover,
is generally reached through a more consensual style of interaction among state
and societal actors, whether it is more "solidaristic," as in some of
the smaller European countries such as the Netherlands or Austria, or more
rational self-interested, as in Germany. Conflict is always possible here too,
but it tends to be preliminary to the reaching of a consensus at the formulation
stage rather than leading to confrontation at the implementation stage, as in
In corporatist state-society relations, moreover, as in
statist relations, implementation is flexible in application. But here, the
rules formulated by the "social partners" are applied by them through
joint self-governing arrangements. The processes by which such implementation
patterns arise are incorporated into the structures of political organization,
for example, through social partners' participation in parliamentary committees,
the decisions of which are then rubber-stamped by the parliament (as in
Austria), or they may be sanctioned by law and not even seen as part of public
policy (as in Germany).
In both statist and corporatist polities, however, policy
implementation is not always flexible. For where the judiciary has some modicum
of independence, implementation can resemble the regulatory or legalistic model
of the pluralist pattern of state-society relations. This means that alongside
the administrative discretion of civil servants or the self-governing
arrangements of societal interests, strongly legalistic patterns of
implementation may impose themselves, proscribing any kind of flexibility. This
has a long tradition in those statist and corporatist polities where the
judiciary has always been independent to some degree (e.g., Britain and
Germany). In such polities, it is often very hard to predict which
implementation process will be operative, the legalist or the flexible.
Generally, this is the result of tradition, and of whether the courts or the
bureaucracy got to the issue first. But the legalistic approach to
implementation has been gaining in recent years in all polities, including in
those statist polities which had traditionally had a highly subordinated
judiciary and a strong administrative tradition (e.g., France). This stems from
reforms that have increased the powers of the judiciary and/or have established
independent regulatory agencies - whether in response to internal dynamics or
external pressures, in particular those from the European Union, where its
regulatory/legalistic model has been imposed in an ever-growing number of
The EU, in fact, whether in policy formulation, policy
implementation, or decision-making culture, has affected its member-states'
policymaking processes, but more so for statist than for corporatist polities.
For one, the EU's pluralist policy formulation process has engendered a loss
of autonomy (discussed above more generally when considering the impact of EU
institutional structures) which has been felt more keenly in statist polities,
where the executive has lost its virtual monopoly on policy formulation, than in
corporatist polities, where the executive never had the same kind of autonomy
given the social partnership. For statist France, where the loss of autonomy was
accepted under the assumption that the "heroism" lost at the national
level would be replaced by a French-led "heroism" at the European
level, the failure to exercise such leadership in all but the most
"heroic" of areas (i.e., the Treaties including the Single Market Act
and Maastricht), has been a source of national dissatisfaction. This has even
occasionally led to mainly symbolic attempts to demonstrate leadership, e.g., in
the demands for a French head of the NATO southern command or of the European
Central Bank. But this only prolongs the popular illusion that the government
somehow has sole responsibility for policies that are in fact made jointly in
Brussels; or that it is therefore accountable for actions taken in Brussels over
which it in fact has little or no control. Both are detrimental to French
For statist Britain, the threat to governmental autonomy
has been even more keenly felt than in France, but more successfully resisted -
as the initial opt-outs to the Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty and to
the European Monetary Union attest. Where the French response has been to seek a
greater EU "heroism" in exchange for its loss at the national level,
the British response (at least with Thatcher and Major) has been to resist
"heroically" what it sees as European incursions on national
sovereignty. But although this may have increased government popularity, it at
the same time eroded democratic legitimacy, given that as often as not the
government incorporated into national law the very EU measures it had so
For corporatist Germany, by contrast, the loss of autonomy
and, concomitantly, legitimacy have not been felt nearly as much as in France or
Britain. This is because of complex decision-making processes which assume joint
responsibility for any policies, whether formulated in Germany or Brussels. The
problem for Germany, by contrast with France or Britain, is that its
institutional structures together with its policymaking processes make it
difficult for it to exercise leadership when it comes to grand strategy, where
France excels, or forcefully to resist policy initiatives of which it
disapproves, where Britain is past master.
Secondly, the EU's regulatory approach to implementation
has produced a loss of flexibility which has been more pronounced in statist
polities, where it has closed off traditional means of accommodation involving
administrative discretion or self-regulatory arrangements, than in corporatist
polities, where joint regulatory arrangements have been allowed to continue. The
loss of the possibility of making exceptions to the rules where EU rules and
regulations are concerned has been particularly problematic for France, given
that citizens who have never had much access to decision-making in policy
formulation and now have even less accommodation in policy implementation are
more likely to resort to confrontation when their concerns are not met.
And this represents a threat not just to French societal stability but also to
democratic legitimacy, given that French democracy has always been predicated on
the state's administrative discretion, that is, on its ability to adapt the
rules to accommodate affected constituencies - which is no longer possible. One
answer for the French, of course, would be to allow greater access to citizens
at the policy formulation stage (so that there would no longer be the need to
adapt the rules in the implementation), and to encourage greater citizen
interest organization and participation in EU policymaking. But this is not easy
to accomplish in a country where the state tends to act and society to react,
although the Jospin government does seem to be attempting to do some of this.
For Britain, by comparison, the major problem has been the
increasing rigidification of public life related to the dramatic increase in EU
(as well as national) regulations, which have replaced the informal, voluntary
arrangements with formal rules administered by independent regulatory agencies
or enforced by the courts. And this represents a threat not only to British
societal autonomy, given the expansion of public powers over a wide range of
areas traditionally left to private actors, but ultimately to traditional
notions of democratic legitimacy, given that British democracy has always been
predicated on leaving as much room as possible to private self-governing
arrangements. And there is no answer for the British on this score, other than
perhaps to seek to keep Brussels from enacting more rules and regulations.
For Germany, by contrast, which has not only always
codified more laws than Britain but has also applied them without exception,
unlike France (or even more so Italy), the EU rules and regulations have not
been nearly as problematic. But this is mainly because those areas traditionally
outside the more legalistic domain, those jointly administered by social
partners, have largely been able to continue to operate as they have
traditionally. In consequence, German policymaking processes, which entail
shared responsibility for policy implementation as much as for formulation have
not been challenged nearly as much as the French or British.
Finally, even the EU's cooperative,
"bottom-up," and less political decision-making culture has engendered
greater adaptational problems for statist polities when it comes to exerting
influence in the EU, given a more conflictual, "top-down," and
political culture, than for corporatist countries, where their more consensual,
more horizontal, and less political decision-making culture is closer to that of
the EU. However, although the French in particular were at a disadvantage early
on by comparison with those countries with long-standing, well developed
lobbies, as in the case of the British, or with cohesive peak associations, as
in the case of the Germans, the differences in country capability in EU lobbying
has been diminishing, as national actors learn a more EU style of interaction.
All in all, though, the EU's quasi-pluralist policymaking
process has tended to impose greater adjustment burdens on statist systems such
as the French and the British, by undermining government autonomy in policy
formulation, reducing flexibility in implementation, and expecting greater
cooperation in EU policymaking, than on corporatist systems such as the German,
which has never had the same kind of governmental autonomy, has lost less
flexibility given an implementation process that has for the most part been
deemed compatible with the regulatory, and has a consensual culture that better
matches the EU's cooperative one.
Because the "fit" between pluralist and statist processes is less
close than between pluralist and corporatist processes in such areas as societal
actors' interest organization and access and in governing bodies' interactive
style and adaptability, statist polities have had a more difficult time than
corporatist ones in adjusting to EU level policy formulation, a more difficult
task in implementing the policy changes engendered by the EU, and a greater
challenge in adapting their national interactive styles to the new realities.
And in consequence, the EU has posed greater problems with regard to democratic
legitimacy for statist polities than for corporatist ones.
Thus, the EU, with its quasi-federal institutional
structures and its quasi-pluralist policymaking processes, has had a significant
impact on member-states' national institutional structures and policymaking
processes. It has generally affected the traditional balance of power in both
unitary and federal states, albeit more in the former than in the latter, by
reducing executive autonomy and control, diminishing legislative power, and
increasing judicial power and subnational independence. And it has altered
traditional patterns of policymaking in both statist and corporatist systems,
albeit again more in the former than in the latter, by reducing government
autonomy in policy formulation and flexibility in implementation.
As such, the EU has generated problems with regard to
democratic representation, accountability, and legitimacy for all of its
member-states , albeit again more for unitary and statist polities than federal
and corporatist polities. This is mainly because the traditional concentration
of power and authority in the executive in unitary, statist systems such as
France and Britain has made it harder for them to legitimize actions that they
no longer entirely control, but for which they are assumed accountable, than in
federal, corporatist systems such as Germany, where the traditional dispersion
of power entails that the executive generally must oversee the carrying out of
policies for which it has never in any case been held entirely accountable.
The differences, in other words, come from the greater
difficulty for the French and British to accept that democratic representation
and accountability need not be concentrated in a single, all-powerful authority
but can be situated in a multiplicity of authorities and emerge through the
plural points of access of a more open policymaking process. But for this, they
would have to redefine their notions of democratic legitimacy and
accountability, and even promote a move toward greater "federal"
separation or sharing of power for national institutional structures which have
traditionally focused power and authority primarily in the executive and toward
greater "pluralistic" openness to interest representation for national
policymaking processes which have traditionally tended to limit interest access
in policy formulation. And to succeed in this, national politicians would
themselves not only have to recognize and embrace such change. They would also
need to engage in a new political discourse capable of convincing the public not
only that this is a necessary change in national understandings of democratic
representation and accountability, but also an appropriate one, despite the fact
that it may violate long-held notions of state authority and responsibility. And
although such a change in discourse is not easy, it may certainly be better than
continuing to mislead the public by creating expectations about national
government power and capabilities that they are bound to disappoint.
1 This paper offers a
theoretical discussion which expands on arguments made in: Vivien A. Schmidt,
"European Integration and Democracy: The Differences among Member States"
Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 4, no. 1 (March 1997): 128-145;
Vivien A. Schmidt, "National Patterns of Governance under Siege: The Impact
of European Integration" in The Transformation of Governance in the
European Union, ed. Beate Kohler-Koch (London: Routledge, forthcoming 1999);
and Vivien A. Schmidt, "European 'Federalism' and its Encroachments on
National Institutions.", paper prepared for presentation for the workshop
"Federalism in Western Europe" at Emory University (Atlanta, Georgia,
Oct. 10-11, 1997, and April 2-3, 1998).
2 There is a growing
literature on the federal characteristics of the European Community/ European
Union and its similarities with other federal systems. See, for example: Fritz
Scharpf, "The Joint Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and
European Integration", Public Administration vol. 66, no. 3 (1988):
239-278; Alberta Sbragia, "The European Community: A Balancing Act," Publius
vol. 23, no. 3 (1993): 28-38; Arthur B. Gunlicks, ed., "Federalism
and Intergovernmental Relations in West Germany: A Fortieth Year Appraisal",
Publius vol. 19, no. 4 (1989); Fritz Scharpf, "Community and
Autonomy: Multi-Level Policy-Making in the European Union", Journal of
European Public Policy vol. 1, no. 2 (Autumn 1994): 219-242; Richard Herr
and Steven Weber, European Integration and American Federalism: A Comparative
Perspective (University of California, Berkeley: Portuguese Studies Program
and International and Area Studies, 1996); Thomas O. Hueglin, "Towards a
Critical Theory of Governance in the EU: Can Federalism Help to Understand What
is Going On?", paper presented at the ECPR Workshop "The
Transformation of Governance in the European Union" (Oslo, March 29-April
3, 1996); T. Hartley, "Federalism, Courts and Legal Systems: The Emerging
Constitution of the European Community", American Journal of Comparative
Law vol. 34 (1986): 229-247; Daniel Wincott, "Federalism and the
European Union: The Scope and Limits of the Treaty of Maastricht", International
Political Science Review vol. 17, no. 4 (1996): 403-415.
3 Preston King, Federalism
and Federation (London: Croom Helm, 1982), p. 77.
approaches include those of Stanley Hoffmann, "Obstinate or Obsolete? The
Fate of the Nation State and the Case of Western Europe", Daedalus
vol. 95 (1966): 892-908; Stanley Hoffmann, "Reflections on the Nation-State
in Western Europe Today", Journal of Common Market Studies vol. 21
(1982): 21-37; Paul Taylor, The Limits of European Integration (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1983); Paul Taylor, "The European Community and
the State: Assumptions, Theories and Propositions", Review of
International Studies vol. 17 (1991): 109-125; Andrew Moravcsik, "Negotiating
the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the
European Community", International Organization vol. 45 (1991):
651-688; Geoffrey Garrett, "International Cooperation and Institutional
Choice: The EC's Internal Market", International Organization vol.
46 (1992): 533-560; Alan Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).
5 The EU has been variously
described as a "federal union" (J. Pinder, European Community: The
Building of a Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), a quasi-state:
(William Wallace, "Government without Statehood", in Policymaking
in the European Union, eds. Helen Wallace and William Wallace, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1996), "co-operative federalism," (Wolfgang
Wessels, "Administrative Interaction" in The Dynamics of European
Integration, ed. William Wallace, London: Pinter, 1990, pp. 229-241), "cooperative
federalism without a state" (Yves Mény, Pierre Muller, and Jean-Louis
Quermonne, "Introduction" in Adjusting to Europe: The Impact of the
European Union on National Institutions and Policies, eds. Yves Mény,
Pierre Muller, and Jean-Louis Quermonne, London: Routledge, 1996, pp. 1-22),
and "condominio" (Philippe Schmitter, "Some Alternative Futures
for the European Polity and Their Implications for European Public Policy"
in Adjusting to Europe: The Impact of the European Union on National
Institutions and Policies, eds. Yves Mény, Pierre Muller, and Jean-Louis
Quermonne, London: Routledge, 1996, pp. 25-40).
6 On multi-level governance,
see: Gary Marks, Liesbet Hooghe and Kermit Blank, "European Integration
from the 1980s", Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 34, no. 3
(1996): 341-378; on governance networks, see: Beate Kohler-Koch, "Catching
up with Change: The Transformation of Governance in the European Union", Journal
of European Public Policy, vol. 3, no. 3 (September 1996): 359-380.
7 See: Alberta Sbragia,
Thinking about the European Future: The Uses of Comparison," in Euro-Politics:
Institutions and Policymaking in the 'New' European Community, ed. Alberta
M. Sbragia (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1992), pp. 257-291; Arthur B.
Gunlicks, ed., "Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations in West Germany:
A Fortieth Year Appraisal", Publius vol. 19, no. 4 (1989); Fritz
Scharpf, "Community and Autonomy: Multi-Level Policy-Making in the European
Union", Journal of European Public Policy vol. 1, no. 2 (Autumn
8 Scharpf, "Community
and Autonomy", pp. 221-222.
9 Dieter Grimm, "Does
Europe Need a Constitution?" European Law Journal vol. 1, no. 3
10 Sbragia, "The European Community", p.
11 On these and other
problems of legitimacy related to "positive" vs. "negative"
integration, see Fritz W. Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and
Democratic? (Oxford: Oxford, 1999).
12 The differences here have
a lot to do with electoral systems, whether proportional representation or
majoritarian, first-past-the-post. Another possible source of executive weakness
is in the case of mixed presidential/parliamentary systems when the president is
of a different political leaning from the parliamentary majority. But in the
only such instance to date (France), the jurisdictional separation of
responsibilities (to the president, foreign policy; to the prime minister,
domestic policy) has avoided any major weakening of the executive although it
has increased internal frictions.
13 See Schmidt,
"European Integration and Democracy.".
14 See: Juliet Lodge, "Transparency
and Democratic Legitimacy", Journal of Common Market Studies vol.
32, no. 3 (Sept. 1994): 343-368.
15 Philip Norton, ed., National
Parliaments and the European Union (London: Frank Cass, 1996).
16 Alan Milward, The
European Rescue of the Nation-State (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1992); Andrew Moravcsik, "Preferences and Power in the European
Community : A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach" in Economic and
Political Integration in Europe: Internal Dynamics and Global Context eds.
Simon Bulmer and Andrew Scott (Oxford, Blackwell, 1995), pp. 29-80.
17 For more detailed
arguments, see: Schmidt, "European 'Federalism' and its Encroachments.".
18 Anne-Marie Burley and
Walter Mattli, "Europe before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal
Integration", International Organization vol. 47 (1993): 41-76;
Joseph H. H. Weiler, "A Quiet Revolution: The European Court of Justice and
its Interlocutors", Comparative Political Studies vol. 26, no. 4 (January
19 See Vivien A. Schmidt,
"Loosening the Ties that Bind: The Impact of European Integration on French
Government and its Relationship to Business," Journal of Common Market
Studies vol. 34, no. 2 (June 1996): 223-254.
20 See Thomas Saalfeld,
"The German Houses of Parliament and European Legislation" in National
Parliaments and the European Union ed. Philip Norton (London: Frank Cass,
21 On compounded
representation, see Joanne Brzinski, Thomas D. Lancaster, and Christian
Tuschhoff, "Federalism and Compounded Representation in Western
Europe." Paper prepared for presentation at the First Workshop of the
"Federalism and Compounded Representation" project, Emory University,
Atlanta/GA, (October 3-6, 1997).
22 Wolfgang Streeck and
Philippe Schmitter, "From National Corporatism to Transnational Pluralism:
Organized Interests in the Single European Market", Politics and Society,
vol. 19, no. 2 (1991): 133-164.
23 In a few areas, the EU
bears little resemblance to the pluralist model. One could argue, for example,
that in the social policy field, formulation appears more corporatist than
pluralist, given the privileged role of business and labor. See Gerda Falkner,
"Social Policy in the EU", in The Transformation of Governance in
the European Union, ed. Beate Kohler-Koch (London: Routledge, forthcoming
24 Sonia Mazey and Jeremy
Richardson, "EU Policymaking: A Garbage Can or an Anticipatory and
Consensual Policy Style?" in Adjusting to Europe: The Impact of the
European Union on National Institutions and Policies, eds. Yves Mény,
Pierre Muller, and Jean-Louis Quermonne (London: Routledge, 1996, pp. 41-58), p.
25 See Schmitter, "Some
Alternative Futures for the European Polity".
26 Mazey and Richardson,
"EU Policymaking: A Garbage Can", p. 42.
27 Michael D. Cohen, James
D. March, and John P. Olsen, "A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice",
Administrative Science Quarterly vol. 17 (1972): 1-25.
28 Giandomenico Majone,
"When does Policy Deliberation Matter?", EUI Working Papers in
Political and Social Sciences 93/12 (Florence: European University Institute,
29 Edgar Grande, "The
State and Interest Groups in a Framework of Multi-Level Decision-Making: The
Case of the European Union", Journal of European Public Policy vol.
3, no. 3 (September 1996): 318-338, p. 329; Sonia Mazey and Jeremy Richardson,
"Introduction. Transference of Power, Decision Rules and Rules of the Game",
in Lobbying in the European Community ed. Sonia Mazey and Jeremy
Richardson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 3-26.
30 Giandomenico Majone,
"The European Commission as Regulator", in Regulating Europe,
ed. Giandomenico Majone (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), pp. 74-75.
31 Mazey and Richardson,
"Introduction", in Lobbying in the European Community, ed.
Mazey and Richardson, pp. 21-22.
32 On the environment and
biotechnology, see: David Judge, David Earnshaw and Ngaire Cowan, "Ripples
or Waves: The European Parliament in the European Community Policy Process",
Journal of European Public Policy vol. 1, no. 1 (June 1994): 28-51.
33 Beate Kohler-Koch, "Organized
Interests in European Integration: The Evolution of a New Type of Governance?"
in Participation and Policymaking in the European Union, ed. Alasdair R.
Young and Helen Wallace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming 1997), pp.
34 On the differences
between the model of pluralism described by democratic theorists such as David
Held and the generic sense of pluralism used here, see: Giovanni Sartori, "The
Background of 'Pluralism'." Paper prepared for delivery at the XVI
World Congress of IPSA (Berlin, August 21-25, 1994).
35 Les Metcalfe, "Après
1992: La Commission pourrat-elle gérer l'Europe?" Revue Française d'Administration Publique vol. 63 (1992).
36 Doug Imig and Sidney
Tarrow, "From Strike to Eurostrike: The Europeanization of Social Movements
and the Development of a Euro-Polity", Working Paper no. 97-10, Weatherhead
Center for International Affairs, Harvard University (December 1997). See also:
Uwe K. H. Reising, "Domestic and Supranational Political Opportunities:
European Protest in Selected Countries 1980-1995" European Integration
Online Papers (EIOP) vol. 2, no. 5, URL:
37 See Scharpf, Governing
38 See: Renaud Dehousse,
"Integration v. Regulation? On the Dynamics of Regulation in the European
Community", Journal of Common Market Studies vol. 30, no. 4 (December
39 For a theoretical
discussion of the differences between pluralist, statist, and corporatist
policymaking processes, see: Vivien A. Schmidt, From State to Market? The
Transformation of French Business and Government (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press 1996), Chapters 1 and 2.
40 For more detail, see
Schmidt, "National Patterns of Governance".
41 Schmidt, "National
Patterns of Governance".
42 See Schmidt,
"National Patterns of Governance".
43 Schmidt, "Loosening
the Ties"; and Schmidt, From State to Market? Chapter 7.
44 See: Schmidt,
"European Integration and Democracy"; and Schmidt, "National
Patterns of Governance".
1999 Vivien A Schmidt
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