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 MPIfG Books

 

 


Helen Callaghan
 
Contestants, Profiteers, and the
Political Dynamics of Marketization

How Shareholders Gained Control Rights
in Britain, Germany, and France

 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018
192 pages
ISBN 978-0-1988-1502-0 | £35.00 (hardcover)

 
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Abstract | Contents | Author


 

 

Abstract


 
Since the early 1980s, governments worldwide have taken many measures to expand the role of markets. Recent political events reflect widespread disenchantment with neoliberal policies, but it remains doubtful whether populist leaders will deliver the market restraints that many of their voters expect. This book explains the resilience of marketization processes by highlighting the role of profiteers – namely those who, like the organizer of a cock fight, benefit from contests regardless of who wins. By setting up shop on the sidelines, profiteers accumulate resources that boost political efforts to maintain and expand the arena of competition. Evidence comes from the evolution of support for shareholder rights relating to takeover bids among key interest groups and political parties in three countries since the late nineteenth century.
 

 

Contents


 
1.    Introduction
1.1  The Puzzle: Market Liberalization across Advanced Capitalist Democracies
1.2  The Argument
1.3  Research Operationalization
1.4  Case Selection
1.5  Epistemology, Ontology, and Method
1.6  Outline
 
2.    The Political Dynamics of Marketizing "Corporate Control"
2.1  The Marketization of Corporate Control as a Regulatory Challenge
2.2  The Marketization of Corporate Control as a Political Process
2.3  Economic Dynamics of the Market for Corporate Control
2.4  Economic Dynamism and Political Salience
2.5  Summary
 
3.    Britain
3.1  The Prewar and Interwar Periods: Barriers to Hostile Bids
       Question 1: What prevented market-enabling reforms?
3.2  Turning Point after World War II: The Removal of Barriers to Hostile Bids
       Question 2: Why did incumbents' defenses crumble?
3.3  Subsequent Evolution of Political Support for Market-Enabling Rules
       Question 3: Why did pro-market groups prevail?
3.4  Summary
 
4.    Germany
4.1  The Prewar, Interwar, and Postwar Periods: Barriers to Hostile Bids
4.2  Turning Point in the 1990s: The Removal of Barriers to Hostile Bids
       Question 1: What prevented market-enabling reforms?
       Question 2: Why did incumbents’ defenses crumble?
4.3  Summary
 
5.    France
5.1  The Prewar, Interwar, and Postwar Periods: Barriers to Hostile Bids
       Question 1: What prevented market-enabling reforms?
5.2  First Turning Point after World War II: State Supervision of Incumbents
5.3  Second Turning Point in the late 1960s: Steps toward Marketization
       Question 2: Why did incumbents' defenses crumble?
5.4  Subsequent Evolution of Political Support for Market-Enabling Rules
5.5  Summary
 
6.    Conclusion
6.1  Findings
6.2  Generalizability
6.3  Alternative Explanations
6.4  Value Added to Previous Research in the Same Empirical Domain
6.5  Broader Theoretical Significance
 
Bibliography
 
Index
 

 

Author


 
Helen Callaghan is a Jean Monnet Fellow at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute (EUI) in Florence. She was previously a senior researcher at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies in Cologne after being a Max Weber Fellow at the EUI. She did her undergraduate studies at the University of Oxford and her graduate work in political science at Northwestern University. Her research focuses on the politics of corporate governance in advanced industrialized economies.
 

 
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