While scholars have long argued that elite social networks influence processes of state building, policy-making, and coalition formation in developing countries, there is little research on the structure and consequences of these networks, particularly using systematic network analysis. The project uses career history datasets that record the educational and work experience of senior political elites to study elite coalition formation in Mexico over a long historical period (1940-2000). It focuses on the role of brokerage and patron-client networks in cabinet appointments. Findings show that elite brokers enjoy a systematic promotion advantage in cabinet appointments. Challenging previous network theory, this advantage is greatest following the consolidation of a one-party political regime, rather than in the conflictive period of formation of this regime. The project is part of a larger study that examines other Latin American countries including Argentina. Previous work examined the influence of networks of technocratic policymakers on consensus formation in financial crises, and future work will address the presidential succession in Mexico under the one-party regime. Project duration: October 2015 to September 2017.